We claim that a weak point in the debate was a lack of a definition of the term interpretation . In the present note, we would like to make that meaning precise and to show how such a clarification is necessary in order to avoid misunderstandings. The concept of interpretation plays a key role in the history of physics, so we hope the present analysis might be helpful to the student.
Max Jammer, 5 in his famous book The philosophy of quantum mechanics, distinguishes four different meanings of the word interpretation. In what follows we restrict our attention to only three different meanings, which we now try to clarify.
II. STATISTICAL REGULARITIES: THE MINIMAL INSTRUMENTALIST IN-TERPRETATION
A physical theory T has at least two components: 6 1) the formalism F , or mathematical apparatus, of the theory, and 2) the rules of correspondence R that establish a link between the formalism and the results of measurement. As an example, in the formalism of quantum mechanics based on a Hilbert space H, the formalism has at least two components:
states represented by density operators ρ on H, and observables represented by self-adjoint operators A, on H. To each vector ψ ∈ H with ψ = 1, there corresponds a pure state ρ = |ψ ψ|.
The link with the measurement results is given by the Born statistical interpretation, where the expectation value E ρ (A) = ψ|Aψ is interpreted as the value one obtains when one realizes several measurements of the system by means of an apparatus A (which corresponds to A ) and estimates the statistical mean of the measurement outcomes.
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If we assume that F and R are the only objects required to define a physical theory 
III. BEHIND THE STATISTICAL REGULARITIES: A REALIST INTERPRETA-TION
It is worth noting that the Born statistical interpretation by itself does not provide a direct correspondence either between ψ and some empirical data or between A and some empirical data.
At variance with the minimal instrumentalist interpretation, one could assume a realist position towards physical theories and try to explain the statistical regularities predicted by the formalism as a consequence of the nature of an underlying physical reality. A second example of a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is the de Broglie double-solution interpretation. 13 It is interesting to note that recently the analogies between such an interpretation and a classical system of droplets walking on a liquid surface has been studied experimentally.
14 Although all such approaches are suggested by the formalism, 3 they have some degree of arbitrariness and are not necessarily valid. For example, the hydrodynamic interpretation was found to be problematic 5 even though its formalism is derivable from the formalism of quantum mechanics.
IV. CHANGING THE FORMALISM
A third kind of "interpretation," which is usually inspired by a realistic position towards the physical theories, occurs when the formalism F is replaced by a different formalism F 
V. ON THE UNAVOIDABILITY OF THE INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
As we have seen, an empirical theory T is divided into a formalism F and a system of rules R that connect the formalism to the measurement results. Because F without R would be a mathematical theory, devoid of any empirical content, the introduction of R is unavoidable. Now, we have several options: (1) stick with the empiricist's interpretation, which in some sense is minimal; (2) opt for a realist approach, which implies the necessity of an interpretation of one (or two) of the concepts of state, observable, and measurement, 20 referring to an existing physical entity (see Sec. III); or (3) try to change the formalism.
In the first case, quantum mechanics (or more generally a physical theory) is only an instrument to make previsions about the physical phenomena. It is not a description of a But all of this makes it even less understandable why an interpretation that involves a modification of the formalism should be considered "scandalous." Indeed, such an interpretation is simply a tentative grasping of a piece of reality and it is not so clear why it must be (a priori ) less successful than standard quantum mechanics in this endeavor. The article by Nikolić 23 is a clever argument supporting such a modified viewpoint. Indeed, as he argues, in a hypothetical version of the history where the Bohmian formulation is proposed before the Born probabilistic interpretation, the Copenhagen interpretation would probably have not achieved great popularity 23 and the Bohmian interpretation would have been the standard one. It is curious that the article by Nikolić is cited by van Kampen as a reminder of the scandal of quantum mechanics. We think it actually supports the thesis that the concept of interpretation is both crucial and unavoidable in quantum mechanics.
